Key Findings And Recommendations Of Report “Six Years After Sachar”
A summary of the key findings and recommendations of the report “Six Years After Sachar” published by the US India Policy Institute in Jan 2013 is presented here. The extensive data and analysis that form the bases for these findings and recommendations are presented in the full report, which can be accessed here.
Key Findings and Recommendations:
1. Establish a national committee on socially inclusive development chaired by the Prime Minister
The UPA has taken a number of initiatives during the last six years since the Sachar Committee Report addressing the deprivation of the Muslim and other minority communities in India. The Ministry of Minority Affairs (MMA) was established in 2006 even before the Sachar Committee completed its report. As soon as the report was finalized, MMA was given the authority to implement the Prime Minister’s revamped 15-Point Program on the Development of Minorities in India. MMA has assumed the position of a nodal agency, whose main function is to appropriate funds from the national budget and channel them to those states that are willing to implement minority-focused programs. Guided by the Sachar Committee Report’s findings, MMA initiated two nationwide programs to improve inclusive development-Multi-sectoral District Development Programs (MsDD) in 90 MCDs and pre-and post-matriculation scholarship programs. At the same time, MMA is responsible for monitoring and evaluating the progress, as is routine for other ministries. Chapter 9 details not only MMA’s overall poor performance but also the lack of transparency and credible data about programs and outcomes.
Both MMA and other ministries responsible for implementing socially inclusive development programs throughout India require a coordinating body to ensure careful monitoring, as well as accountability and efficient use of public funds. A supervisory agency is necessary to provide responsible leadership for the integration of socially inclusive development efforts across ministries and every level of government.?In other words, the office of the Prime Minister needs to assume responsibility for socially inclusive development programs across mainstream ministries and departments and require rigorous supervision and monitoring of implementation.
This work should be undertaken by a National Committee on Socially-Inclusive Development (NCSID) headed by the Prime Minister and should include ministers of selected line ministries and at least one-third of members should be academics and civil society institutions. As a supervisory body, this committee would oversee the implementation and monitoring of socially inclusive development. The committee would charge line ministries and departments with ensuring that expenditure is proportionate to the population of targeted groups of minorities and Muslims at different geographic levels. The National Development Council (NDC) must schedule an exclusive meeting on the issue of inclusive social development with a focus on minorities.
2. Integrate socially inclusive development goals into the programs of more ministries and departments
The centralization of authority and funding for minority development in MMA is counter to the broad and all-encompassing recommendations in the Sachar Committee Report. Accordingly, proper implementation of its recommendations requires at least a dozen line ministries to be responsible for relevant programs such as human resources and education, labor and employment, finance, social welfare, industries, Panchayati raj, and urban and poverty alleviation. These line ministries manage large budgetary allocations to achieve targets and improve performance in their respective fields. They also have to ensure equity and equal access for diverse social groups and religious communities.
Twelve ministries and departments have been included under the PM’s 15-Point Program for the Welfare of Minorities. More need to be identified and involved, additionally institutions such as the Indian Planning Commission, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), and the University Grants Commission (UGC) should be brought under its purview. Selected specific ministries and their potential actions are listed below:
Ministry of Finance, Department of Financial Services
a. Opening of bank branches in districts with substantial minority/Muslim population
b. Review RBI’s master circular on priority sector lending to minority/Muslims
Ministry of Human Resource Development
a. Target minority communities under the Kasturba Gandhi Balika Vidyalaya (KGBV) scheme
b. Target minority communities under the universalization of access to quality secondary education (RMSA)
c. Target minority communities under the UGC-linked girls’ education program d. Target minority communities for new community polytechnics
Ministry of Labour
a. Provide social security to home-based workers
b. Rehabilitate child laborers
Ministry of Urban Development
a. Target minority communities under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM)
b. Target minority communities under the Urban Infrastructure Development Scheme for Small and Medium Towns (UIDSSMT)
c. Target minority communities via the Integrated Housing and Slum Development Programme (IHSDP)
3. Move socially inclusive development efforts away from special purpose vehicles and towards integration into mainstream ministries and development programs
National Minority Financial Development Corporation The National Minorities Financial Development Corporation (NMFDC) and the National Commission for Minorities (NCM), SPVs, were established in 1994 and 1992, respectively. In the intervening years, neither has come remotely close to advancing socially inclusive development. Given its extremely low allocations, high turnover, and scant coverage, NMFDC is a total failure. There is no data on the term loans and micro-credit schemes across religious communities. Evaluation and impact assessment is impossible because there is no information on beneficiary characteristics. Furthermore, extending benefits according to recommendations by local politicians and bureaucrats has caused credits to flow to households that are not below double the poverty line. Yet, the very criteria for identifying loan recipients are impractical. For example, what is the thinking behind giving a term loan of rupees 5 lakh to persons with a household income below double the poverty line? Given the serious flaws in the NMFDC operations the eligibility requirements for loans, its small allocations, and political interference and misuse at the state and local levels, lack of accessible facilities, to name but a few, it is in the national interest to wind up the Corporation. NMFDC does not have branches but operates through a limited number of offices of ‘state channelizing agencies. Accordingly, NMFDC is inaccessible and practically unknown amongst the target population. The normal banking infrastructure would be a more effective and efficient mechanism for socially inclusive lending programs that target minorities. Mandating bank branches to offer financial services that target minorities would deliver and track services in a more cost-efficient and transparent manner than NMFDC (see point 9 below).
4. MCD programs: MMA and RBI leave out the majority of the minorities from coverage.
The geographical unit of Minority Concentration Districts (MCDs) used by ministries and RBI is mired with conceptual and practical problems such that nearly two-thirds of the minority population is excluded from targeted programs. Using MCD as the geographical unit, program implementation takes place in such a way that religious groups can be and are excluded from accessing services. For example, the Prime Minister’s 15-Point Programme focuses on MCDs and does not directly target Christian and Muslim minority groups living all over India. The MMA’s MCD program also bypasses the urban areas due to definitional and jurisdictional reasons. Data presented in Chapter 5 details problems associated with using MCDs as the basis for program implementation. Since many MCDs are too large and heterogeneous geographic units for implementing socially inclusive development programs, the taluka/block is a more effective unit for targeting the minority population. Furthermore, the taluka, villages, and mohallas with high concentrations of Muslims should be identified for program implementation. Mosque, church, and gurudwara committees can be recognized as community-specific civil society institutions in order to become eligible to facilitate implementation.
5. Establish and monitor a Diversity Index for key economic and social sectors
There is a need for baseline and longitudinal data on the impact of socially inclusive development programs. To this end, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) should constitute a committee of experts (economists, statisticians, demographers, sociologists) to establish and monitor a diversity index for (i) educational institutions, (ii) banks and lending institutions, (iii) state governments, (iv) major Government of India departments such the railways, post and telegraph, security agencies, urban transportation, and leading PSUs. Such an index would also provide a framework for benchmarking and evaluating socially inclusive development programs.
6. Increase representation of minorities/ Muslims in local governing bodies
PMO must hold the Department of Panchayati Raj and the Department of Urban Development accountable for increasing the representation of minorities/Muslims in gram panchayats/taluka panchayats/Zila panchayats and urban local bodies such as town panchayats and city municipality/ municipal corporations. This can be done through a process of nomination/co-option to the respective bodies of members (with a focus on women) from the religious minorities. The Andhra Pradesh Municipal Laws (Amendment) Act 2006 provides a useful model (see Sachar Committee Report, p. 188).
7. Support sustained increases in GDP through increased investment in socially inclusive development
Data analysis in Chapter 4 on the contributions of different socio-religious communities to India’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) demonstrates that Muslims have high per capita productivity quotients at all educational levels although it declines at the highest level. These data strongly suggest that given their high productivity quotients, increased access to higher education, and technical training, Muslims have the potential to efficiently increase their contribution to GDP.
8. Increase access of Muslims to employment in the formal sector and to employment programs of the Department of Rural Development
During the period 2001-2011, Muslims have not made any gains in rates of participation in the formal employment sector. Increases would indicate improved opportunities for Muslims to participate in more productive and modern employment sectors. Rates of participation in self-employed and informal sectors have not declined for Muslims, similarly indicating that the Muslim community is not benefitting from opportunities to exit traditional sectors of the economy. Participation in salaried employment is only 30 percent for urban Muslims compared to about 37 percent for SCs/ STs, 36 percent for Hindu-OBCs, and 46 percent for upper-caste Hindus. Additionally, the share of Muslims in salaried employment is considerably less than their share in the total urban workforce and considerably higher for the self-employed and casual labor categories. Furthermore, labor force participation analysis suggests a relatively higher unemployment rate amongst Muslims.
The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) is the flagship anti-poverty program of the UPA-II national government. Its purpose is to create multi-million man-days of paid employment for rural households. NREGS funds come from amalgamating past programs and amount to about one-third of the Department of Rural Development’s annual budgetary allocation. However, since its launch in 2006, data shows that only 5.6 percent of the number of available days that are programmatically possible is utilized by the eligible population. Although the incidence of poverty among Muslims is higher than the national average and those living in rural areas have high levels of unemployment and income insecurity, Muslim participation in MGNREGS is negligible. In fact, data in Chapter 3 show that Muslims are excluded at the outset and do not obtain the necessary job cards. That Muslims are also excluded from other major programs such as the Mass Anganwadi Program, the Primary and Elementary Education Program, and the Mass Micro-credit Program further indicates the structural disadvantage and discrimination facing Muslims. The National Committee on Socially-Inclusive Development would be the appropriate body to oversee an inquiry into the causes for the exclusion of Muslims from formal sector employment and MGNREGS and to monitor programs that increase their rates of participation.
9. Address the failure of financial inclusion programs with vigorous policy development and rigorous program planning, implementation, accountability, and monitoring?
Large inequities in access to bank credit through regular scheduled commercial banks-particularly public sector banking institutions-were highlighted in the Sachar Committee Report.4 The failure of Minority Development Corporation programs largely due to lack of transparency and meager allocations by the central and state governments were also brought to the policymakers’ attention. However, there is no evidence that post-Sachar Committee financial inclusion programs under the authority of the RBI and Finance Ministry are benefitting minority communities. Furthermore, RBI and Finance Ministry have not reported on the access of minorities to development funds although the former routinely collect such data across India. Chapter 6 examines other available data on financial inclusion efforts in 121 MCDs and finds practically no improvement in access to credit by minority communities and that Muslims’ share of credit is disproportionately low. In order to ensure that minorities have equitable access to financial institutions and capital, it is necessary that RBI, Finance Ministry, and other ministries and departments involved in financial inclusion design and implement effective programs and report timely and accurate data on program outcomes. Again, the National Committee on Socially? Inclusive Development would be the appropriate body to ensure that government units responsible for financial inclusion programs are held accountable for meeting the objectives and serving their target populations.
10. Improve implementation of scholarship programs targeting minority students?
Post-Sachar Committee data indicate an alarming decline in the rate of improvement at all levels of education (primary, matriculation, and graduate and above) for the Muslim community. Data in Chapter 2 of this report show the literacy level and level of improvement between 2001 and 2011 were modest for Muslims compared to other communities. At the level of matriculation (10 years of schooling), rates for Muslims both for this level and for improvement decline to very low levels, indicating the possibility of serious policy disadvantages and exclusion for Muslims. This trend is worse at higher levels of literacy, where there is a net decline instead of improvement for the general Muslim category, and barely any improvement even in the case of OBC Muslims. The most pressing concern that the Government of India has failed to rectify is the situation where funds allocated to Sarva Siksha Abhiyan to address the educational backwardness of communities, including the minorities, have not been fully and appropriately spending. Organizational biases of the state-level bureaucracy in education departments and in programs for minorities mean that the benefits of these programs do not reach the target communities. Chapter 9 presents data on the scholarship programs targeting minorities and Muslims and finds that the need far exceeds the allocated resources and official data misrepresent the huge failures of these programs.
It is, therefore, essential to invoke the constitutional provisions of Article 15 which direct the government to create equal opportunity and equity in access to all levels of education even if it requires a reservation. To educationally empower minorities the government needs to target eligible minority students under the three schemes: pre-matriculation, post-matriculation, and merit-cum-means scholarships. Data indicates that each year only a partial number and share of the eligible students are reached-and almost none of the earlier year’s recipients continued to receive benefits for subsequent years.
11. Establish an Equal Opportunity Commission (EOC)
Another mechanism is needed to ensure institutional access to all deprived citizens (including religious minorities) and equity in the public sphere (see a separate report on the need for an EOC in India). Despite a proliferation of public institutions with the responsibility of protecting the constitutional and legal rights of minorities, systemic discrimination or bias is pervasive throughout India. The formation of an EOC will be a cornerstone of the state’s commitment to civil rights, diversity, and socially inclusive development.
12. Establish effective mechanisms to ensure and monitor the implementation of the provisions of the Right to Information (RTI) Act.?
Transparency in governance is a democratic right and responsibility. The RTI Act provides mechanisms to access government-held data. Chapter 7 documents the results of filing RTI requests for documents related to the financial inclusion policy of the RBI and the issuance of OBC certificates at the national and state levels. The government did not respond to many of the requests, thereby blocking access to essential data on the social welfare of minority and deprived communities in India. Furthermore, the current implementation of RTI shifts responsibility to successively lower rungs of government all the way down to the village level. Additionally, there is no formal procedure and mechanism for aggregating RTI data from the lower levels of bureaucracy to the district or state levels. Based on this evidence, it is erroneous to claim that the Indian people are benefitting from the provisions of the RTI Act. Given the ineffectiveness of RTI in its current form, the national government needs to demonstrate its commitment to transparency at the national and state levels. To this end, it must provide effective leadership that ensures RTI mechanisms to make government information genuinely accessible and useful.
13. Inadequate Institutional Mechanisms to seek redressal in the Indian Bureaucratic and Democratic Structure
Bureaucratic procedures are followed by public institutions, government departments, delivery centers, local security centers, and so on. It is common to approach an officer superior to the decision-maker for relief. But in the Indian situation, a formal appeal and request for reconsideration of a decision are rarely possible. The bureaucratic chain of command is rigid, opaque, and not easy to break into by the common citizens. Since these institutions themselves are the executors and implementers of the government policies and programs, they do not accept their shortcomings and defects and are not amenable to providing reasonable redressal. In brief, the administrative recourse gets easily exhausted without relief.
Legal recourse through courts of law - Various levels of legal institutions and courts – the local to district, state, and national. This is one of the independent wings of the democratic structure of India. The courts and the hierarchy are not easily accessible to common citizens. By design, the courts do not ordinarily address the systemic bias that leads to exclusion and marginalization as a matter of routine and/or priority. There is no legal process to enforce social equity and stop inequity to happen and prevailing. The court judgments take awfully lengthy amounts of time, have tedious procedures, and long waiting times, and are unaffordable for the poor Human Rights Commission (HRC), As a signatory to international covenants, HRC was established in India in 1993. In over 20 major states HRCs are in place.HRC in India mostly functions as an extended wing of the national government. It generally does not initiate procedures against the government in power. It generally deals with issues and situations which are normally dealt with by the local police and security agencies. Systemic bias and discrimination in the social, economic, educational, and employment spheres have never been addressed by HRC in India. It has a poor record of documentation and research. Specified Special Purpose Commissions
The National Commission of Minorities (NCM), and Commission for Backward Classes (not discussed)
These are the special purpose vehicles established by the government generally under a ministry of the national government. For example, NCM is now under the administrative control of MMA. The mandate and objectives of NCM are wide-ranging including the ones relating to societal, economic, and educational opportunities for minorities. NCM has a statutory responsibility, under Section 9 (1) (g) of the NCM Act, 1992, to evaluate the progress of the development of the minorities and to suggest appropriate measures, to be taken by the government, in respect of any community. Functionally NCM has never undertaken any such tasks and it has failed to deliver especially in the areas of ensuring access to education, and economic and social services to the minorities / Muslim community in India. This has happened mostly due to the lack of independent functioning of NCM as well as poor quality bureaucratic and financial support. NCM annual reports, having been tabled in the Parliament, have never been discussed or debated in the Parliament. NCM itself accepts the fact that it has to work out the adequacy of its scope and that it has to increase coverage both in terms of issues as well as geographic reach. NCM claims that it has not received the expected support from MMA. NCM itself considers that it is not authorized to monitor government programs and one has to work at the level of the district and become sensitive to the people’s needs. Accordingly, even the Ministry of Program Implementation and/or the Ministry of Poverty Alleviation are actively not involved. Thus one finds the total failure of NCM to address the issue of equal opportunity and equity.